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The paper presents a major overhaul to the World Bank’s 
past estimates of global poverty, incorporating new 
and better data. Extreme poverty—as judged by what 
“poverty” means in the world’s poorest countries—is 
found to be more pervasive than we thought. Yet the data 
also provide robust evidence of continually declining 
poverty incidence and depth since the early 1980s. For 
2005 we estimate that 1.4 billion people, or one quarter 
of the population of the developing world, lived below 
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our international line of $1.25 a day in 2005 prices; 25 
years earlier there were 1.9 billion poor, or one half of 
the population. Progress was uneven across regions. The 
poverty rate in East Asia fell from almost 80 percent to 
under 20 percent over this period. By contrast it stayed 
at around 50 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, though with 
signs of progress since the mid 1990s. Because of lags in 
survey data availability, these estimates do not yet reflect 
the sharp rise in food prices since 2005.
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1. Introduction 
In assessing the extent of poverty in a given country one naturally focuses on a poverty 
line that is considered appropriate for that country. However, poverty lines vary across countries 
in terms of their purchasing power, and they have an economic gradient, such that richer 
countries tend to adopt higher standards of living in defining poverty.2 For the purposes of 
measuring poverty in the world as a whole, the World Bank’s “$1 a day” measures have aimed to 
apply a common standard, anchored to what “poverty” means in the world’s poorest countries. 
By this view, two people with the same purchasing power over commodities should be treated 
the same way—both are either poor or not poor—even if they live in different countries.3 And by 
focusing on how poverty is defined in the poorest countries, the $1 a day line gives the global 
poverty measure a salience in focusing on the world’s poorest in absolute terms.  
Implementing this approach requires data on prices, to permit comparisons between 
countries. International comparisons of economic aggregates have long recognized that market 
exchange rates—which tend to equate purchasing power in terms of internationally traded 
goods—are deceptive, given that some commodities are not traded; this includes services but 
also many goods, including some food staples. Furthermore, there is likely to be a systematic 
effect, stemming from the fact that low real wages in developing countries entail that labor-
intensive non-traded goods tend to be relatively cheap. In the literature, this is known as the 
“Balassa-Samuelson effect,”4 and is the now widely-accepted explanation for an empirical 
finding known as the “Penn effect”—that GDP comparisons based on market exchange rates 
tend to understate the real incomes of developing countries.5 Similarly, market exchange rates 
overstate the extent of poverty in the world. For this reason, global economic measurement, 
including poverty measurement, has used Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates rather than 
market exchange rates. A PPP is the conversion rate for a given currency into a reference 
currency (invariably the $US) with the aim of assuring parity in terms of purchasing power over 
commodities, both internationally traded and non-traded. 
                                                 
2  Evidence on this point (using two data sets from different sources, one for the 1980s and one 
post-1990) can be found in Ravallion et al. (1991) and Ravallion et al. (2008).  
3  Ravallion (2008) provides a theoretical justification for this view and discusses the validity of the 
welfare assumptions on which it is based. 
4  See Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). 
5  The term “Penn effect” stems from Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston, 1991), which 
provided the price level indices across countries that were used to establish this effect empirically.  
 3
Following this approach, Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle (RDV) (1991) (in research 
done for the 1990 World Development Report) compiled data on national poverty lines across 33 
countries and proposed a poverty line of $1 per day at 1985 PPP as being typical of low-income 
countries.6 Using household surveys for just 22 countries they estimated that one third of the 
population of the developing world in 1985 lived below the $1 a day standard.7  
Since then the Bank’s researchers have updated the original RDV estimates of global 
poverty measures in the light of new and often better data. The estimates done for the 2000/01 
World Development Report: Attacking Poverty used an international poverty line of $1.08 a day, 
at 1993 PPP, based on the original set of national poverty lines in RDV (Chen and Ravallion, 
2001). In 2004, about one in five people in the developing world—slightly less than one billion 
people—were deemed to be poor by this standard (Chen and Ravallion, 2007). This was the first 
time that the Bank’s global poverty count had fallen below one billion.  
Alas the revised estimates reported in this paper suggest that our celebrations in finally 
getting under the one billion mark for the “$1 a day” poverty count were premature—probably 
10 years premature. The need for the (major) revision reported here stems in large part from 
biases in prior rounds of the price surveys that were used to estimate PPPs. The main data source 
for estimating PPPs has been the price surveys within countries done for the International 
Comparison Program. This started in 1968 with PPP estimates for just 10 countries, based on 
rather crude price surveys.8 Prior to the present paper, our global poverty measures had been 
anchored to the 1993 round of the ICP. An independent evaluation (known as the Ryten Report; 
see UN, 1998) of the 1993-96 ICP rounds identified a number of methodological and operational 
concerns, including lack of clear standards in defining internationally comparable commodities. 
This is a serious concern when comparing the cost of living between poor countries and rich 
ones, given that there is likely to be an economic gradient in the quality of commodities 
                                                 
6  RDV also used a lower line of $0.75 per day, which was the predicted line in the poorest country 
in their data set, Somalia, though it also happened to coincide with India’s line at the time. 
7  By the “developing world” we mean all low and middle income countries—essentially the Part 2 
member countries of the World Bank.   
8  The ICP started as a joint project of the UN and the University of Pennsylvania, with support 
from the Ford Foundation and the World Bank. Prior to 2000, the Penn World Tables (PWT; see 
Summers and Heston, 1991) were the main source of the PPPs for consumption used in the World Bank’s 
global poverty measures. In 2000 we switched to the PPPs estimated by the Bank’s Development Data 
Group. There are methodological differences between the PWT and the Bank’s PPPs, as discussed in 
Ackland et al. (2006) and World Bank (2008, Appendix G).   
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consumed; without strict standards in defining the products to be priced, there is a risk that one 
will underestimate the cost of living in poor countries by confusing quality differences with price 
differences. PPPs will be underestimated in poor countries.  
This highlights the difficulty of doing price surveys for the purposes of international 
comparisons. The existence of non-traded goods is (on the one hand) the main reason why we 
need to use a PPP rather than market exchange rate, but (on the other hand) non-traded goods are 
harder to compare between countries. The only way to deal with this is through detailed product 
listings and descriptions, which add significantly to the cost of the data collection.  
A better funded round of the ICP in 2005, managed globally by the World Bank’s 
Development Data Group, has taken considerable effort to address this problem as well as 
introducing other improvements in the data and estimation methods for PPPs (World Bank, 
2008a,b).9 Following the Ryten Report, a number of methodological and operational 
improvements were implemented by the 2005 ICP. The new ICP data imply some dramatic 
revisions to past estimates, consistent with the view that the old ICP data had under-estimated the 
cost-of-living in poor countries. The comparisons of the 2005 and 1993 ICP rounds made by 
Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (RCS) (2008) are consistent with the view that there was such a 
bias in the 1993 PPPs. The Penn effect is still evident, but it was overstated in the past. 
The 2005 ICP also greatly expanded country coverage. China participated officially for 
the first time, and the results have naturally attracted much attention, given that they suggest that 
China’s economy in 2005 is 40 percent smaller than we all thought.10 The new PPP for China is 
about half the market exchange rate, while prior estimates for 1993 had suggested it was about 
one quarter of the market rate.11 Keidel (2007) claimed that the new PPP for China adds 300 
million to the count of that country’s poor. Some observers have gone further to claim that the 
new PPPs also cast doubt on the extent of China’s—and (hence) the world’s—progress over time 
against poverty. For example, the Bretton Woods Project (an NGO) claims that the new PPPs 
“…undermine the much-trumpeted claims that globalization has reduced the number of people 
                                                 
9  While we do not know of any cost comparisons, there can be little doubt that the 2005 ICP 
entailed a far higher cost than previous rounds; as the Ryten Report had also discussed, fixing the 
problems with the ICP data would inevitably come at a cost.   
10  With the PPP revisions implied by the 2005 ICP round, China’s GDP per capita at PPP for 2005 
falls from $6,760 to $4,091 (World Bank, 2008b).  
11  The old estimate was based a bilateral comparison of 1986 prices between the United States and 
China as documented in Ruoen and Kai (1995). 
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living in extreme poverty”.12 This would be surprising if it were true, given that rates of 
economic growth at the country level are not altered by changing the PPP benchmark; with 
China’s (remarkable) growth rates intact one must expect that progress over time will be similar 
using the new PPP, even if the poverty rate is higher (by international standards) at all dates.  
This paper estimates the global poverty count for 2005 and updates all our past estimates 
back to 1981. There are three key improvements over past estimates. The first is the use of the 
results of the 2005 ICP. While this ICP round is clearly a significant advance over previous ICP 
rounds, one problem is that (like prior ICP rounds) there is a degree of “urban bias” in the ICP 
price surveys, in that the sampling of outlets for collecting prices did not always properly 
represent rural areas, where prices tend to be lower in most developing countries. This clearly 
matters to poverty measurement. Based on the information provided by the ICP team at the 
World Bank (drawing on information from regional ICP offices) we identified a number of 
countries where such a bias is likely and we implement a correction drawing on supplementary 
data on the differentials in national poverty lines between urban and rural areas.    
Second, we implement an updated international poverty line and test robustness to that 
choice.  Recognizing that the new PPPs also change the $US value of national poverty lines in 
the poorest countries, our international poverty line of $1.25 per day in 2005 is deliberately 
lower than the 2005 value in the US of our old international line. The new line is the mean of the 
national poverty lines for the poorest 15 countries in terms of consumption per capita.13 (The 
median is $1.27 a day.) To test robustness of our main qualitative results to the choice of poverty 
line we also give results for a range of lines spanning $1.00 to $2.50 per day in 2005 prices. The 
lower bound (not to be confused with the old “$1 a day” line, which was not in 2005 prices) 
corresponds fairly closely to the national poverty line used by India, while the upper bound is the 
median of the poverty lines for all countries except the poorest 15. A $2.00 line is the median 
poverty line found amongst developing countries as a whole. 
Third, we improved on the coverage of the household survey data base. As far as 
possible, we rely on household surveys for measuring poverty, following past practice. In this 
paper we draw on 675 surveys, spanning 1979-2006 and 116 countries. Our methods of 
analyzing these data follow Chen and Ravallion (2004, 2007). The international poverty line is 
                                                 
12  See http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-560008.  
13  RCS also propose a schedule of relative poverty lines; in a forthcoming paper we will report our 
estimates of relative poverty in the world using these lines. 
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converted to local currencies in the ICP benchmark year and is then converted to the prices 
prevailing at the time of the relevant household survey using the best available Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) for that country. (Equivalently, the survey data on household consumption or 
income for the survey year are expressed in the prices of the ICP base year, and then converted 
to PPP $’s.) Then the poverty rate is calculated from that survey. All inter-temporal comparisons 
are real, as assessed using the country-specific CPI. We make estimates at three-year intervals 
over 1981-2005. Interpolation/extrapolation methods are used to line up the survey-based 
estimates with these reference years, including 2005.  
Note that PPPs for different benchmark years cannot be expected to be consistent with 
national data sources (Dalgaard and Sørensen, 2002; World Bank, 2008b). We follow common 
practice in letting the national data override the ICP data for inter-temporal comparisons; this is 
the most reasonable position to take given the changes in methodology between different ICP 
rounds (World Bank, 2008b). Thus the PPP conversion is only done once for a given country, 
and all estimates are revised back in time consistently with the data for that country. So the PPPs 
serve the role of locating the residents of each country in the “global” distribution, but we do not 
mix the new PPPs with those from previous ICP rounds. We will, however, discuss the salient 
differences between the new results reported here using the 2005 ICP and our past estimates.   
We find that the incidence of poverty in the world is higher than past estimates have 
suggested. The main reason is that the 2005 ICP price data suggest that past PPPs had implicitly 
underestimated the cost of living in most developing countries. However, we find that the 
poverty profile across regions of the developing world and the overall rate of progress against 
absolute poverty are fairly similar to past estimates.  
 
2. The 2005 ICP round and its implications for global poverty measures 
The 2005 ICP round is the most complete and thorough assessment to date of how the 
cost of living varies across countries. The world was divided into six regions with different 
product lists for each. All regions participated in the 2005 ICP, although the participation rate 
was lower for Latin America. The ICP collected primary data on the prices for 600-1000 
(depending on the region) goods and services grouped under 155 “basic headings” deemed to be 
comparable across countries. The prices were typically obtained from a large sample of outlets in 
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each country. The price surveys were done by the government statistics offices in each country, 
under supervision from regional authorities.14 
The 2005 ICP is a clear improvement over 1993—the last year used for global poverty 
measurement. The number of countries participating is larger (146, as compared to 117 in 1993). 
This is also the first time that a number of countries—including China, which we return to—have 
participated in the ICP. And the surveys have been implemented on a more scientific basis. The 
2005 ICP also used stricter standards in defining internationally comparable qualities of the 
goods identified in the ICP price surveys. New methods were used for measuring government 
compensation and housing. Adjustments were also made for the lower average productivity of 
public sector workers in developing countries (lowering the imputed value of the services 
derived from public administration, education and health). Ring comparisons (linking regional 
PPP estimates through global prices) were done for more countries (18 in all—a marked 
improvement over past ICP rounds). Otherwise, the PPPs calculated from the ICP data (and 
reported in World Bank, 2008a) follow standard methods; as in the past, the Bank uses a 
multilateral extension of the bilateral Fisher price index known as the EKS method.15  
The changes in the methods of product listing and pricing are of particular relevance to 
global poverty measurement. Following the recommendations of the Ryten Report (UN, 1998), 
the 2005 ICP applied more rigorous standards of specifying internationally comparable 
commodities for linking across countries (World Bank, 2008b). In comparison to 2005, it is 
likely that the 1993 ICP would have used lower qualities of goods in poor countries than would 
have been found in (say) the US market.16 The goods priced by the 1993 ICP tended to be more 
typical of the items available in local markets. The 1993 ICP round also over-valued the services 
derived from government in developing countries. RCS show that a sizable underestimation of 
                                                 
14  The PPP was based on a price survey for 98 of our 116 countries. For the other 18 the PPPs were 
estimated by ICP staff from a regression model; those countries are Algeria, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haití, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, St. Lucia, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
15  On the advantages of this method over the alternative (Geary-Khamis) method see Ackland et al. 
(2006). In the 2005 ICP the Africa region chose a different aggregation method (African Development 
Bank, 2007); World Bank (2008b) describes this as a minor difference to the EKS method.  
16  Heston and Summers (2008) describe the ways in which the 2005 ICP was an improvement over 
past ICP rounds, and point specifically to the “…quantum improvement in the way regional comparisons 
were linked together from the standpoint of reviewing price collection” (p.3). There were also a number 
of problems in the implementation of the 1993 ICP round, as discussed in Ahmed (2003). 
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the 1993 PPP is implied by the new PPP data and the data on rates of inflation. Furthermore, the 
extent of this underestimation tends to be greater for poorer countries.  
While these are clear improvements, the new PPPs still have some limitations. As the 
introduction noted, there is a problem of “urban bias” in the ICP price surveys for a number of 
counties; the next section describes our methods of addressing this problem. As was argued in 
Ravallion et al. (1991), a further concern is that the weights attached to different commodities in 
the conventional PPP rate may not be appropriate for the poor. Deaton and Dupriez (2008) have 
estimated “PPPs for the poor” for a subset of countries with the required data; the preliminary 
results do not suggest that the implied re-weighting has much impact on the consumption PPP.17 
Another limitation is that the PPP is a national average. Just as the cost of living tends to be 
lower in poorer countries, one expects it to be lower in poorer regions within one country, 
especially in rural areas. Ravallion et al. (2007) have allowed for urban-rural cost of living 
differences facing the poor, and provided an urban-rural breakdown of our prior global poverty 
measures using the 1993 PPP. We plan to update these estimates in future work.    
Some dramatic revisions to past PPPs are implied, not least for the two most populous 
developing countries, China and India (neither of which had actually participated in the 1993 
ICP). For example, the 1993 consumption PPP used for China was 1.42 Yuan to the $US in 1993 
(updating an earlier estimate by Ruoen and Chen, 1995), while the new estimate based on the 
2005 ICP is 3.46 Yuan (4.09 if one excludes government consumption). The corresponding 
“price level index” (PPP divided by market exchange rate) went from 25% in 1993 to 52% in 
2005. So the Penn effect is still evident, but the size of this effect has declined markedly, with a 
new PPP at about half the market exchange rate rather than one quarter. Adjusting solely for the 
differential inflation rates in the US and China one would have expected the 2005 PPP to be 1.80 
Yuan not 3.46. Similarly, India's 1993 consumption PPP was Rs 7.0, while the 2005 PPP is Rs 
16, and the price level index went from 23% to 40%.  If one updated the 1993 PPP for inflation 
one would have obtained a 2005 PPP of Rs 11 rather than Rs 16.  
                                                 
17  The Asian Development Bank (2008) has taken a further step of implementing special price 
surveys for Asian countries to collect prices on explicitly lower qualities of selected items than those 
identified in the standard ICP. Using lower quality goods essentially entails lowering the poverty line. In 
terms of the impact on the poverty counts for Asia in 2005, the ADB’s method is equivalent to using a 
poverty line of about $1.20 a day by our methods; this calculation is based on a log linear interpolation 
between the relevant poverty lines.  
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Clearly these PPP revisions have important implications for assessing the extent of 
absolute poverty in the world. There are two ways the PPP revisions matter and the two effects 
work in opposite directions.  The first effect is that a higher PPP means that the $ values of the 
consumption levels in poor countries fall; this increases aggregate poverty relative to any given 
international $ value of the poverty line. It could also matter to the overall rate of progress in 
reducing poverty, given that there is a compositional effect in the aggregate, in that the (implicit) 
weights on the growth rates of individual countries change with the new PPPs.   
The second effect is that the PPP revisions change the international poverty line, which is 
anchored to the poverty lines found in low-income countries. Those poverty lines remain the 
same in local currency units, but their $ values tend to fall. Thus the changes introduced by the 
2005 ICP imply that simply updating the old 1993 poverty line for inflation in the US is 
deceptive about the appropriate international poverty line for the developing world in 2005. The 
international poverty line for 1993 proposed by Chen and Ravallion (2001), and used in our 
subsequent updates, was $1.08 a day ($32.74 per month). If one adjusts only for inflation in the 
US one obtains $1.45 a day at 2005 prices. Later in this paper we provide global estimates using 
the $1.45 line. However, RCS show that $1.45 in 2005 prices is well above the 2005 PPP 
equivalent of the $1.08 line in 1993 prices, when that equivalence is determined by calculating 
the mean national poverty line at 2005 PPP for countries with a 1993 national poverty line in a 
neighborhood of $1.08.18 The 1993 PPP’s were too low and hence the $ values of the national 
poverty lines were set too high in 1993.  
Which of these two effects dominates depends on how the revisions introduced by the 
2005 ICP change the PPP relativities between poor and less poor countries.  RCS show that the 
implied proportionate upward revision to the 1993 PPP is greater for poorer countries. Thus, 
given that the international line is anchored to the lines found in the poorest countries, we can 
expect to find that, on balance, the first effect is dominant and global poverty counts rises.19 We 
confirm that expectation later in this paper. 
                                                 
18  More precisely, RCS estimate ]08.1$[ 9305 =ii ZZE  where tiZ  is the $ poverty line in country i 
using ICP round t. Using a non-parametric regression, RCS obtain 13.1$]08.1$[ˆ 9305 ==ii ZZE . 
19  The impact of the PPP revisions on the log of the aggregate headcount index is the weighted sum 
across all countries of the impacts on the log of the PPP less the impact on the log international poverty 
line, where the weights are given by the product of the country-specific shares of aggregate poverty and 
the country-specific elasticity of the cumulative distribution function evaluated at the international line. 
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3. International poverty lines 
In setting an international poverty line using the 2005 ICP we have aimed to follow the 
same definition used in our past work, namely that the line should be representative of the 
national lines found in the poorest countries—in the spirit of the original “$1 a day” line 
(Ravallion et al., 1991; World Bank, 1990). For this purpose, RCS have compiled a new set of 
national poverty lines for developing countries drawn from the World Bank’s country-specific 
Poverty Assessments and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers done by the governments of the 
countries concerned. While the RDV data set on national poverty lines was drawn from sources 
for the 1980s, the new and larger compilation produced by RCS are all post-1990, such that in no 
case do the proximate sources overlap. RCS converted these national poverty lines to a common 
currency using the new set of consumption PPPs estimated from the 2005 round of the ICP. 
Figure 1 plots the poverty lines compiled by RCS against log household consumption per 
capita at 2005 PPP; there are 74 countries with complete data. The Figure also gives a 
nonparametric regression of the national poverty lines against log mean consumption. Above a 
certain point, the poverty line rises with mean consumption. The overall elasticity of the poverty 
line to mean consumption is about 0.7. However, the slope is essentially zero amongst the 
poorest 20 or so countries, where absolute poverty clearly dominates.  
RCS also show that the economic gradient in national poverty lines evident in Figure 1 is 
driven more by the gradient in the non-food component of the poverty lines (which accounts for 
about 60% of the overall elasticity) than the food component, although there is still an 
appreciable share attributable to the gradient in food poverty lines. Note that national food 
poverty lines are invariably anchored to predetermined nutritional requirements for good health 
and normal activity levels, and those nutritional requirements tend to be quite similar across 
countries at different levels of economic development. So the economic gradient in the food 
poverty line largely reflects the fact that richer countries tend to use a more expensive food 
bundle—more meat and vegetables, less starchy staples, and more processed foods generally—
for attaining the same nutritional needs.   
On the basis of the pattern evident in Figure 1, RCS proposed an international poverty 
line of $1.25 a day for 2005, which is the mean of the lines found in the poorest 15 countries in 
                                                                                                                                                             
The proportionate impact on the international poverty line is the weighted mean of the impacts on the 
PPPs for the reference group of countries, where the weights are the appropriate poverty-line shares.       
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terms of consumption per capita, namely: Malawi, Mali, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Uganda, 
Gambia, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Tajikistan, Mozambique, Chad, Nepal and Ghana. 
(Their median poverty line is very similar, at $1.27 per day.) Consumption per capita for this 
group ranges from $1.03 to $1.87 per day with a mean of $1.40 per day. The level of this poverty 
line is quite robust to the choice of the poorest 15 countries (taking plus or minus five countries 
ranked by consumption per capita). However, it makes sense to focus on the poorest 15 since the 
econometric tests reported in RCS imply that national poverty lines tend to rise with 
consumption per person when it exceeds about $2 per day, which is near the upper bound of the 
consumption levels found amongst these 15 countries. Of course, there is still a variance in the 
national poverty lines at any given level of mean consumption, including amongst the poorest 
countries. The poverty lines found amongst the poorest 15 countries vary from $0.70 to $1.90 per 
day and RCS estimate the robust standard error of the $1.25 line to be $0.10 per day.  
To assess the robustness of qualitative comparisons, we will also provide estimates for 
four other lines: (i) $1.00 a day at 2005 PPP, which is very close to the national poverty line used 
by the Government of India;20 (ii) $1.45, as obtained by updating the 1993 $1.08 line for 
inflation in the US; (iii) $2.00, which is the median of the RCS sample of national poverty lines 
for developing and transition economies; and (iv) $2.50, twice the $1.25 line, which is also the 
median poverty line of all except the poorest 15 of countries in the RCS data set of national 
poverty lines. The range $1.00 to $1.45 is roughly the 95% confidence interval for our estimate 
of the mean poverty line for the poorest 15 countries. 
We use the same PPPs to convert the international lines to local currency. While the ICP 
aimed to obtain nationally representative prices that was not always the case. As noted in the 
introduction, the main source of sampling bias appears to be that the surveys were confined to 
urban areas in some countries. For example, the ICP survey for China was confined to 11 cities; 
although the survey included some surrounding rural areas, it cannot be considered 
representative of rural China; evidence on this point is provided by Chen and Ravallion (2008).  
Based on ICP sampling information we treat the 2005 consumption PPPs as urban PPPs for 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Peru, 
Thailand and Uruguay. We then use existing differentials in urban-rural poverty lines at country 
                                                 
20  India’s official poverty lines for 2004/05 were Rs 17.71 and Rs 11.71 per day for urban and rural 
areas. Using our urban and rural PPPs for 2005 (described below) these represent $1.03 per day.  
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level for these countries (from Ravallion et al., 2007) to correct the national PPP for the purpose 
of measuring poverty.  For India the ICP included rural areas, but they were underrepresented. 
We derived urban and rural poverty lines consistent with both the urban-rural differential in the 
national poverty lines and the relevant features of the design of the ICP samples for India.21  
 
4. Household survey data 
We have estimated all poverty measures ourselves from the primary (unit record or 
tabulated) sample survey data rather than relying on pre-existing poverty measures. And all our 
previous estimates have been updated to assure internal consistency. Households are ranked by 
either consumption or income per person. The distributions are weighted by household size and 
sample expansion factors. Thus our poverty counts give the number of people living in 
households with per capita consumption or income below the international poverty line. The 
primary data come in various forms, ranging from micro data (the most common) to specially 
designed grouped tabulations from the raw data, constructed following our guidelines. 
Our reliance on survey data merits comment in the light of a debate in the literature about 
the implications for global poverty measures of the discrepancies found between aggregate 
household consumption as estimated from surveys and the private consumption component of 
domestic absorption in the national accounts (NAS), which tends to be higher than the survey 
mean. Some authors have argued that the survey mean should be ignored and replaced by NAS 
consumption per capita, though still using the surveys for measuring inequality.22 This will yield 
lower poverty measures for most countries; for some countries (including India) it will also yield 
a higher rate of poverty reduction over time. However, other researchers (including ourselves) 
have argued that there is no basis for assuming that the gap between the survey mean and NAS 
                                                 
21  For food, clothing and footwear, 72% of the 717 sampled price outlets for India’s ICP were in 
urban areas and only 28% were rural, while for other goods the outlets were solely urban. The ICP took 
simple averages of these prices. We assumed that goods other than food, clothing and footwear had the 
same prices in rural and urban areas. Then the implicit urban and rural international poverty lines for 
India consistent with the 2005 ICP have weights of 0.72 and 0.28 respectively. The ratio of the urban 
official poverty line for India in 2004/05 to the rural line is 1.51.  Given the 2005 consumption PPP for 
India of Rs 15.60 from World Bank (2008a), the Rupee values of the international line of $1.25 for urban 
and rural areas in 2005 can then be backed out, and are Rs 21.53 and Rs 14.24 per day respectively.  
22  See Bhalla (2002) and Karshenas (2003) (though their methods differ). Others have used a similar 
method based on GDP rather than consumption (including Sala-i-Martin, 2006, and Bourguignon and 
Morrisson, 2002) though this appears to have been done more for computational convenience as it did not 
require estimation from micro data.  
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consumption is entirely due to errors in the surveys; the NAS numbers are no less questionable in 
many developing countries, and the discrepancy between the two data sources reflects a number 
of real factors, including differences in what is being included in the two measures (Deaton, 
2005; Ravallion, 2003).23 Nor is it plausible that the discrepancy is distribution-neutral, in that 
the surveys get inequality right and the mean wrong; there is likely to be some under-reporting or 
selective compliance in a household survey, but it would seem unlikely that these sources of 
error would only affect the mean and not the measure of inequality.24  
We draw on 675 surveys for 116 countries, as listed in the Appendix. Taking the most 
recent survey for each country, about 1.23 million households were interviewed in the surveys 
used for our 2005 estimate. The surveys were mostly done by governmental statistics offices as 
part of their routine operations. Not all available surveys were included. A survey was dropped if 
there were known to be serious comparability problems with the rest of the data set. Also, we 
have not used surveys for 2006 or 2007 when we already have a survey for 2005—the latest year 
for which we provide estimates in this paper. As in past work, we have tried to eliminate obvious 
comparability problems, either by re-estimating the consumption/income aggregates or the more 
radical step of dropping a survey. However, there are problems that we cannot deal with. For 
example, it is known that differences in survey methods (such as questionnaire design) can create 
non-negligible differences in the estimates obtained for consumption or income. 
Following past practice, “poverty” is assessed using household per capita expenditure on 
consumption or household income per capita as measured from the national sample surveys.25 
When there is a choice we use consumption in preference to income, on the grounds that 
consumption is likely to be the better measure of current welfare on both theoretical and practical 
grounds.26  Of the 675 surveys, 417 allow us to estimate the distribution of consumption 
                                                 
23  For example, NAS private consumption includes imputed rents for owner-occupied housing, 
imputed services from financial intermediaries and the expenditures of non-profit organizations; none of 
these are included in consumption aggregates from standard household surveys. Surveys, on the other 
hand, are undoubtedly better at picking up consumption from informal-sector activities.  
24  Korinek et al. (2006) examine the implications of selective compliance for measures of poverty 
and inequality. They find that correcting for selective compliance in the Current Population Survey for the 
US leads to a higher inequality measure but has little effect on measures of poverty. 
25  The use of a “per capita” normalization is standard in the literature on developing countries.  This 
stems from the general presumption that there is rather little scope for economies of size in consumption 
for poor people.  However, that assumption can be questioned; see Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995). 
26  Consumption requires fewer imputations and assumptions, is likely to be reported more 
accurately and is arguably a better measure of current economic welfare than income. For further 
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expenditures; this is true of all the surveys used in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, though income surveys are more common in Latin America.27 Given 
that savings and credit can be used to smooth consumption from income shocks, one expects 
higher inequality for incomes than consumptions, for the same place and data. 
The measures of consumption (or income, when consumption is unavailable) in our 
survey data set are reasonably comprehensive, including both cash spending and imputed values 
for consumption from own production. But we acknowledge that even the best consumption data 
need not adequately reflect certain “non-market” dimensions of welfare, such as access to certain 
public services, or intra-household inequalities. For these reasons, our poverty measures need to 
be supplemented by other data, such as on infant and child mortality, to obtain a more complete 
picture of how living standards are evolving. 
We use standard poverty measures for which the aggregate measure is the (population-
weighted) sum of individual measures. In this paper we report three such poverty measures.28 
The first measure is the headcount index given by the percentage of the population living in 
households with consumption or income per person below the poverty line.  We also give 
estimates of the number of poor, as obtained by applying the estimated headcount index to the 
population of each region under the assumption that the countries without surveys are a random 
sub-sample of the region.  Our third measure is the poverty gap index, which is the mean 
distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the line where the mean is taken over the 
whole population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gaps.  
Having converted the international poverty line at PPP to local currency in 2005 we 
convert it to the prices prevailing at each survey date using the country-specific official 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).29 The weights in this index may or may not accord well with 
consumer budget shares at the poverty line. In periods of relative price shifts, this will bias our 
                                                                                                                                                             
discussion see Ravallion (1994, 2003) and Deaton and Zaidi (2002). It has also been argued that 
consumption is a better welfare indicator in developed countries; see Slesnick (1998). 
27  For a few cases we do not have consumption distributions but we still have survey-based 
estimates of mean consumption. Then we replace the income mean by the consumption mean leaving the 
Lorenz curve the same (i.e., all incomes are scaled up by the ratio of the consumption mean to the income 
mean).  There is, however, no obvious basis for adjusting the Lorenz curve. 
28  PovcalNet provides a wider range of measures, drawn from the literature on poverty 
measurement. See http://econ.worldbank.org/povcalnet. 
29      Note that the same poverty line is generally used for urban and rural areas. There are three 
exceptions, China, India and Indonesia, where we estimate poverty measures separately for urban and 
rural areas and use sector-specific CPIs.   
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comparisons of the incidence of poverty over time, depending on the extent of utility-
compensated substitution possibilities for people at the poverty line. 
We use population weights (for urban and rural poverty measures, as well as across 
countries) from the World Bank’s Development Data Platform (DDP).     
We started the series in 1981 and made estimates at three yearly intervals, up to 2005. For 
the 116 countries, 14 have only one survey; 18 have two surveys; 14 have three; while 70 have 
four or more surveys over the period, of which 23 have 10 or more surveys.  If there is only one 
survey for a country then we estimate measures for each reference year by applying the growth 
rate in real private consumption per person from the NAS to the survey mean — assuming that 
the Lorenz curve for that country does not change.30 This seems the best option for dealing with 
this problem, though there can be no guarantee that the Lorenz curve would not have shifted or 
that a survey-based measure of consumption would have grown at the same rate as private 
consumption in the NAS. For example, growth in the latter might reflect growth in the spending 
by non-profit organizations— which are not separated from households in the NAS for most 
developing countries—rather than household spending (Ravallion, 2003).  
While we follow our past practice in relying on the household surveys in measuring 
poverty at the survey date, we will use the annual NAS data for interpolation purposes given the 
irregular spacing of surveys. We first estimate mean consumption at the reference year using the 
NAS growth rate between the survey year and the reference year. Suppose the reference year is 
1993 and we have two surveys, for 1989 and 1995 say. We have two means at the reference year 
based on two surveys, M93(89) and M93(95) where M93(t) is the estimated mean for 1993 using 
the survey for year t. Based on the 1989 distribution and M93(89), we get the H93(89), the 
headcount index obtained using the 1993 mean and the 1989 distribution. Similarly, based on the 
1995 distribution and M93, we get H93(95). Then the poverty headcount for 1993 is estimated 
by the weighted average of H93(89) and H93(95).31 
                                                 
30     For a few SSA countries, private consumption per capita is missing from the World Bank’s 
Development Data Platform; we use the series from Africa Development Indicators 2007.  
31  Thus H93=[(1995-1993)/(1995-1989)].H93(89)+[(1993-1989)/(1995-1989)].H93(95).  In a small 
number of cases this method did not give sensible results in that either M93(89) or M93(95) was outside 
the interval [M(89), M(95)] even though the NA growth rates were positive for both 1989-93 and 1993-
95. In these cases we scaled down the growth rates according to the survey means for 1989 and 1995. 
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In the aggregate, 90% of the population of the developing world is represented by 
surveys within two years of 2005.32 Survey coverage by region varies from 74% of the 
population of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to 98% of the population of South 
Asia. Naturally, the further back we go, the fewer the number of surveys—reflecting the 
expansion in household survey data collection for developing countries since the 1980s. And 
coverage deteriorates in the last year or two of the series, given the lags in survey processing.  
Two instructive guides to the reliability of our estimates are to count the number of 
surveys by year and to measure the coverage rate. Figure 2 gives the number of surveys; we give 
the three-year moving average centered on each year (given that having a survey last year or next 
year can help greatly in estimating poverty this year).  For comparison purposes, we also give the 
numbers of surveys used by Chen and Ravallion (2004). By this measure, our estimates around 
the mid 1990s onwards are clearly the most reliable while our estimate for 1981 is the least 
reliable.  We have only 18 surveys up to 1983, though the number doubles by 1985. By contrast 
we have 480 surveys after 1993.  Naturally the number of surveys drops off in the last year or so, 
given the lags in availability; there has been a marked improvement in the coverage of recent 
surveys, though this partly reflects our unwillingness to make an estimate yet for 2006 (as we 
still only have seven surveys for that year, at the time of writing). 
Most regions are quite well covered from the latter half of the 1980s (East and South Asia 
being well covered from 1981 onwards).33  Unsurprisingly, we have weak coverage in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (EECA) for the 1980s; many of these countries did not officially exist 
then.  More worrying is the weak coverage for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the 1980s; indeed, 
our estimates for the early 1980s rely heavily on projections based on distributions around 1990. 
Table 1 gives the average survey year by region for each reference year.   
By comparing Table 1 with the corresponding table in Chen and Ravallion (2004) we can 
see how much improvement there has been in reducing the lags in survey data availability. Like 
the present paper, Chen and Ravallion (2004) reported results for a reference year that was three 
years prior to the time of writing (namely 2001, versus 2005). Table 2 gives the average lag by 
                                                 
32  Some countries have graduated from the set of developing countries; we apply the same 
definition over time to avoid selection bias. In this paper our definition is anchored to 2005.  
33  China’s survey data for the early 1980s are probably less reliable than later years, as discussed in 
Chen and Ravallion (2004) where we also describe our methods of adjusting for certain comparability 
problems in the China data, including changes in valuation methods. 
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region (where zero means no lag for the latest reference year). The overall mean has fallen by 
one year (1.6 to 0.6 years); for the region with the lowest mean lag for 2001, namely East Asia, 
the average lag is down to almost zero; for the region with the highest lag in 2001, namely SSA, 
the lag has also fallen appreciably, from 4.0 to 1.5 years, and MENA is now the region with the 
highest mean lag in survey data availability.   
Note that the lags in Table 2 reflect both the frequency of surveys and our access to the 
data. Based on our observations in assembling the data base for this study, we would conjecture 
that the large lag for MENA is due more to access to existing surveys than to the frequency of 
those surveys, while for SSA it is due more to infrequent production of adequate surveys.   
The second indicator is the percentage of the population covered by household surveys. 
Table 3 gives the coverage rate by region and for each reference year; a country is defined as 
being covered if there was a survey (in our data base) within two years of the reference date (a 
five-year window). Note that our method only strictly requires one survey per country, though 
we have almost six surveys per country on average. But naturally, ceteris paribus, the more 
surveys we have for a given country the more confident we are about the estimates. 
The weak coverage for EECA, MENA and SSA in the 1980s is evident in Table 3. Our 
estimates for these regions in the 1980s are heavily dependent on the extrapolations from NAS 
data. We will discuss the likely biases.  
Note that there is a “hole” in coverage for South Asia in 1999. This reflects the well-
known comparability problem due to India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) for 1999/2000.34 
We decided to drop that NSS survey round given that we now have a new survey for 2004/05 
that we consider to be reasonably comparable to the previous survey round of 1993/94. We also 
decided to only use the 5-yearly rounds of the NSS, which have larger samples and more detailed 
and more comparable consumption modules (aside from the 1999/00 round). Unfortunately, this 
leaves a 10-year gap in our survey coverage for India; the estimates for India over the 
intervening period use our interpolation method as described above. Including all available 
survey rounds for India adds to the variability in the series but does not change the trend.35  
                                                 
34  Further discussion and references can be found in Datt and Ravallion (2002). 
35  If one uses the 1999/2000 survey for India one obtains a sharp fall in that year, and a subsequent 
rise in poverty incidence to 2005.  However, this is clearly spurious, being driven by the fact that the 
1999/2000 survey over-estimates level of consumption relative to other survey rounds.  
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Given the lags in survey data availability, our estimates will not include the impacts of 
the recent rise in food and fuel prices. Ex ante projections of the welfare impacts of the rise in 
food prices for a set of nine low-income countries by Ivanic and Martin (2008) predict that, on 
balance, the rise in food prices over 2005-07 will have been poverty-increasing. 
 
5. Measures of global poverty 
We report aggregate results over 1981-2005 for the regions of the developing world and 
(given their populations) China and India. Jointly with this paper, we have updated the website 
PovcalNet to provide public access to the underlying country-level data set, so that users to 
replicate these results and try different assumptions, including different poverty measures, 
poverty lines and country groupings, including deriving estimates for individual countries.36 
The top row of Table 4, panel (a), reproduces our past estimates (from Chen and 
Ravallion, 2007) of the aggregate headcount indices using the $1.08 line at 1993 PPP for 1981-
2005 at three-year intervals.37 We then give our new estimates for the same reference years using 
the 2005 PPPs and for the range of lines from $1.00 to $2.50 in 2005 prices. Table 5 gives the 
corresponding counts of the number of poor.  
Recall that the $1.45 line is obtained by adjusting the old $1.08 line in 1993 prices for 
inflation in the US between 1993 and 2005. However, as argued by RCS, the $1.25 line is more 
representative of the poverty lines found amongst the poorest countries in the world; in this 
sense, the $1.25 line for 2005 is more consistent with the definition of poverty underlying prior 
international poverty lines used by the World Bank. The $1.45 line is about two standard errors 
above the mean for the poorest 15 countries.38 And the $1.00 line in 2005 prices is too low, 
being well below (by more than two standard errors) the average line for the poorest countries. 
The bulk of the following discussion will focus on the $1.25 line, though we test the robustness 
of our qualitative poverty comparisons to that choice. 
                                                 
36  See http://econ.worldbank.org/povcalnet. The process of updating the PovcalNet web site to 
incorporate the 2005 PPPs will be complete by September 16 2008.  
37  We have updated the 2004 estimate in Chen and Ravallion (2007) to 2005 consistently with the 
data sued in that paper. 
38  Looking at it another way, based on the regression function in Figure 1, the $1.45 line 
corresponds to a level of consumption per capita of around $2.25 per day—above which the value at the 
poverty lines start to rise with mean consumption (RCS).   
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Using the new PPPs from the 2005 ICP, it is clear that the global poverty count is 
appreciable higher than past estimates has suggested. Both the $1.25 and $1.45 lines indicate a 
substantially higher poverty count in 2005 than obtained using our old $1.08 line in 1993 prices; 
1.7 billion people are found to live below the $1.45 line, and 1.4 billion live below the $1.25 line. 
Focusing on the $1.25 line, we find that 25% of the developing world’s population in 2005 is 
poor, versus 17% using the old line at 1993 PPP—representing an extra 400 million people 
living in poverty.39   
The two effects of the new PPPs on the global poverty rate (as described in section 2) can 
now be quantified. Holding constant the real value in the US of the 1993 poverty line of $1.08 
per day, but revising the PPPs, the poverty rate for the developing world in 2005 rises from 17% 
to 32% (the latter figure corresponds to the $1.45 line). However, this does not allow for the fact 
that the same PPP revisions mean that the $US value of the poverty line at PPP was also 
overestimated. This second effect brings the poverty rate down from 32% to 25%, giving the net 
increase of 8% points.   
Over the 25 year period, we find that the percentage of the population of the developing 
world living below $1.25 per day was halved, falling from 52% to 25%.  (Expressed as a 
proportion of the population of the world, the decline is from 42% to 21%; this assumes that 
there is nobody living below $1.25 per day in the developed countries.40)  The number of poor 
fell by slightly over 500 million, from 1.9 billion to 1.4 billion over 1981-2005 (Table 5). The 
trend rate of decline in the $1.25 a day poverty rate over 1981-2005 was 1% point per year; 
regressing the poverty rate on time the estimated trend is -0.99% per year with a standard error of 
0.06% (R2=0.97). This is slightly higher than the trend we had obtained using the 1993 PPPs, 
which was -0.83% per year (standard error=0.11%). Simply projecting this trend forward to 
2015, the estimated headcount index for that year is 16.6% (standard error of 1.5%). Given that 
the 1990 poverty rate was 41.6%, the new estimates confirm the conclusion of Chen and 
Ravallion (2007) that the developing world as a whole is on track to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 1990 poverty rate by 2015. 
                                                 
39  Note that the difference between the 25% and 17% numbers reflects other updates to the data 
base, besides the new PPPs. When we use the new data base for 2005 to estimate the poverty rate based 
on the 1993 PPPs we get a slightly higher figure, namely 17.6% (957.4 million people).  
40  The population of the developing world in 2005 was 5453 million, representing 84.4% of the 
world’s total population; in 1981, it was 3663 million or 81.3% of the total. 
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The 1% point per year rate of decline in the poverty rate also holds if one focuses on the 
period since 1990 (not just because this is the base year for the MDG but also recalling that the 
data for the 1980s is weaker). The $1.25 poverty rate fell 10% points in the 10 years of the 1980s 
(from 52% to 42%), and a further 17% points in the 16 years from 1990 to 2005.   
The qualitative comparisons over time are robust to the choice of poverty line; for any 
given pair of reference years in Table 4, the direction of change is the same across all poverty 
lines, and (indeed) between the old $1.08 line at 1993 PPP and the new lines. The conclusion that 
the incidence of poverty in the developing world as a whole has been falling persistently over 
time is robust to both the level of the poverty line and the PPPs.  
It is notable that 2002-05 suggests a higher (absolute and proportionate) drop in the 
poverty rate than other periods. Given that lags in survey data availability mean that our 2005 
estimate is more heavily dependent on non-survey data (notably the extrapolations based on 
NAS consumption growth rates) there is a concern that this might be exaggerated. However, that 
does not seem likely. The bulk of the decline is in fact driven by countries for which survey data 
are available close to 2005. The region for which non-survey data have played the biggest role 
for 2005 is Sub-Saharan Africa. If instead we assume that there was in fact no decline in the 
poverty rate over 2002-05 in SSA then the total headcount index (for all developing countries) 
for the $1.25 line in 2005 is 26.2%—still suggesting a sizeable decline relative to 2002.    
China’s success against absolute poverty has clearly played a major role in this overall 
progress. Panel (b) in Tables 4 and 5 repeats the calculations excluding China.  Figure 3 plots the 
poverty rates over time with and without China. The $1.25 a day poverty rate falls from 40% to 
28% over 1981-2005, with a rate of decline that is less than half the trend including China; the 
regression estimate of the trend falls to -0.43% per year (standard error of 0.03%; R2=0.96), 
which is almost identical to the rate of decline for the non-China developing world that we had 
obtained using the 1993 PPPs (which gave a trend of -0.44% per year, standard error=0.01%). 
Based on our new estimates, the projected value for 2015 is 25.1% (standard error=0.8%), which 
is well over half the 1990 value of 35% (Table 4). So we can also confirm the assessment of 
Chen and Ravallion (2004) that past trends imply that the developing world outside China is not 
on track to reaching the MDG for poverty reduction.  
Our estimates suggest less progress (in absolute and proportionate terms) in getting above 
the $2 per day line than the $1.25 line. The poverty rate by this higher standard has fallen from 
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70% in 1981 to 47% in 2005 (Table 4). The trend is about 0.8% per year (a regression coefficient 
on time of -0.84; standard error=0.08); excluding China, the trend is only 0.3% per year (a 
regression coefficient of -0.26; standard error=0.05%). This has not been sufficient to bring 
down the number of people living below $2 per day, which was about 2.5 billion in both 1981 
and 2005 (Table 5). Thus the number of people living between $1.25 and $2 a day has actually 
risen sharply over these 25 years, from about 600 million to 1.2 billion. This marked “bunching 
up” of people just above the $1.25 line suggests that the poverty rate according to that line could 
rise sharply with aggregate economic contraction (including real contraction due to higher 
prices). 
Regional differences. Table 6 provides a regional breakdown of our estimates of the 
aggregate poverty measures for 2005, for each of the five poverty lines used in Tables 4 and 5. 
The regional rankings are not robust to the poverty line. Two changes are notable. At lower lines 
(under $2 per day) SSA has the highest incidence of poverty, but this switches to South Asia at 
higher lines. (Intuitively, this difference reflects the higher inequality found in Africa than South 
Asia.) Second, MENA’s poverty rate exceeds LAC’s at $2 or higher, but the ranking reverses at 
lower lines. 
Table 7 gives the estimates by year over 1981-2005 for four lines, $1.00, $1.25, $2.00 
and $2.50. There have been notable changes in regional poverty rankings over this period (Table 
7).  Looking back to 1981, East Asia was the region with the highest incidence of poverty in the 
world, with 78% of the population living below $1.25 per day and 93% below the $2 line. South 
Asia had the next highest poverty rate, followed by SSA, LAC, MENA and lastly, EECA. 
Twenty years later, SSA had swapped places with East Asia where the $1.25 headcount index 
had fallen to 17%, with South Asia staying in second place.  EECA had overtaken MENA.  
The composition of world poverty has changed noticeably over time. The number of poor 
has fallen sharply in East Asia, but risen elsewhere (Figure 4). For East Asia, the MDG of 
halving the 1990 “$1 per day” poverty rate by 2015 was already reached a little after 2002. 
Again, China’s progress against absolute poverty was a key factor; looking back to 1981, 
China’s incidence of poverty (measured by the percentage below $1.25 per day) was roughly 
twice that for the rest of the developing world; by the mid-1990s, the Chinese poverty rate had 
fallen well below average. There were over 600 million fewer people living under $1.25 per day 
in China in 2005 than 25 years earlier.  Progress was uneven over time, with setbacks in some 
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periods (the late 1980s) and more rapid progress in others (the early 1980s and mid 1990s); 
Ravallion and Chen (2007) identify a number of factors (including policies) that account for this 
uneven progress against poverty over time (and space) in China.  
Over 1981-2005, the $1.25 poverty rate in South Asia fell from almost 60% to 40%, 
which was not sufficient to bring down the number of poor (Table 8).  If the trend over this 
period in South Asia were to continue until 2015 the poverty rate would fall to 32.5% (standard 
error=1.2%), which is more than half its 1990 value. So South Asia is not on track to attaining 
the MDG without a higher trend rate of poverty reduction. Note, however, this conclusion is not 
robust to the choice of the poverty line. If instead we use a lower line of $1.00 per day at 2005 
prices then the poverty rate would fall to 15.7% (standard error=1.3%) by 2015, which is less 
than half the 1990 value of 34.0%. Not surprisingly (given its population weight), the same 
observations hold for India, which is not on track for attaining the MDG using the $1.25 line but 
is on track using the $1.00 line (which is also closer to the national poverty line in India).41  
 The extent of the “bunching up” that has occurred between $1.25 and $2 per day is 
particularly striking in both East and South Asia, where we find a total of about 900 million 
people living between these two lines, roughly equally split between the two sides of Asia. While 
this points again to the vulnerability of the poor, by the same token it also suggests that 
substantial further impacts on poverty can be expected from economic growth, provided that it 
does not come with substantially higher inequality.      
We find a trend declining in the poverty rate in LAC, by both lines, but not sufficient to 
reduce the count of the number of poor over the 1981-2005 period as a whole, though with more 
encouraging signs of progress since 1999. The MENA region has experienced a fairly steady 
decline in the poverty rate, though (again) not sufficient to avoid a rising count in the number of 
poor in that region.     
We find a generally rising incidence and number of poor in EECA using the lower lines 
($1.00 and $1.25 a day) though there are very people are poor by this standard in EECA. The 
$2.50 a day line is more representative of the poverty lines found in the relatively poorer 
countries of EECA. By this standard, the poverty rate in EECA has shown little clear trend over 
time in either direction, though there are encouraging signs of a decline in poverty since the late 
                                                 
41  The corresponding poverty rates for the $1.00 line in India are 42.1 (1981), 37.6, 35.7, 33.3, 31.1, 
28.6, 27.0, 26.3, 24.3 (2005). 
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1990s. The paucity of survey data for EECA in the 1980s should also be recalled. Thus our 
estimates are heavily based on extrapolations, which do not allow for any changes in distribution. 
One would expect that distribution was better from the point of view of the poor in EECA in the 
1980s, in which case poverty would have been even lower than we estimate—and the increase 
over time even larger.  
The incidence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is virtually unchanged at slightly over 
50% in both 1981 and 2005.  Within this period, there was an increase until the mid 1990s, and 
there has been an encouraging downward trend since then. The number of poor by our new $1.25 
a day standard has almost doubled in SSA over 1981-2005, from 214 million to over 390 million.  
The share of the world’s poor by this measure living in Africa has risen from 11% in 1981 to 
28% in 2005. The trend increase in SSA’s share of poverty is 0.67% points per year (standard 
error=0.04% points), implying that one third of the world’s poor will live in this region by 2015 
(more precisely, the projected poverty rate for that year is 33.7%, with a standard error of 0.8%). 
Figure 5 gives the time series for SSA for the $1.00 and $2.00 lines as well as the $1.25 
line. All three lines indicate that the poverty rate peaked in the mid-1990s and fell after that; the 
$1.25 a day poverty rate for SSA fell from 59% in 1996 to 51% in 2005. The decline is 
proportionately higher the lower the poverty line; for the $1 a day line, the poverty rate in 2005 
is 16% lower than its 1996 value.   
Poverty gaps. Table 9 gives the Poverty Gap (PG) indices for $1.25 and $2.00 per day. 
The aggregate PG index for 2005 is 7.6% for the $1.25 line and 18.6% for the $2 line. To put 
these numbers in perspective, the GDP per capita of the developing world was $11.30 per day in 
2005 (at 2005 PPP). The aggregate poverty gap for the $1.25 line is 0.84% of GDP per capita, 
while it rises to 3.29% for the $2 line. World (including the OECD countries) GDP per capita 
was $24.58 per day, implying that the global aggregate poverty gap was 0.33% of global GDP 
using the $1.25 line and 1.28% using the $2 line.42   
Comparing Tables 7 and 9, it can be seen that the regional rankings in terms of the 
poverty gap index are similar as those for the headcount index, and the changes over time follow 
similar patterns. What the PG measures do is magnify the inter-regional differences seen in the 
                                                 
42  This assumes that nobody lives below our international poverty line in the OECD countries. 
Under this assumption, the aggregate poverty gap as a % of global GDP is )/).(/.( NWNYZPG  where 
PG is the poverty gap index (in %), Z is the poverty line, Y  is global GDP per capita, N is the population 
of the developing world and NW is world population.  
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headcount indices. The most striking feature of the results in Table 7 is the depth of poverty in 
Africa, with a $1.25 per day poverty gap index of almost 21%—roughly twice the next poorest 
region by this measure (South Asia). For the $1.25 line, Africa’s aggregate poverty gap 
represents 3.2% of the region’s GDP; for the $2 line it is 9.0%.43  
Table 10 gives the mean consumption of the poor.44 For 2005, those living below the 
$1.25 a day line had a mean consumption of $0.87 (about 3.5% of global GDP per capita). The 
overall mean consumption of the poor tended to rise over time, from $0.74 per day in 1981 to 
$0.87 in 2005 by the $1.25 line, and from $0.94 to $1.21 for the $2 line.  Poverty has become 
shallower in the world as a whole.   
The mean consumption of Africa’s poor is not only lower than in any other region, it has 
shown very little increase over the period (Table 9). The mean consumption of those living under 
$1.25 per day in Africa was $0.72 per person per day in 1981 and was almost unchanged at 
$0.73 in 2005.  For the $2 line, the mean consumption of Africa’s poor remained roughly 
constant.  The same persistence in the depth of poverty is evident in MENA and LAC, though 
the poor have slightly higher average levels of living in both regions.  The mean consumption of 
EECA’s poor has actually fallen since the 1990s, even though the overall poverty rate was 
falling. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Global poverty measurement combines data from virtually all branches of the statistical 
system. The measures reported here bring together household surveys, census data, national 
accounts and both national and international price data. Inevitably there are comparability and 
consistency problems when combining data from such diverse sources and the data are still far 
from ideal. However, thanks to the efforts and support of governmental statistics offices and 
international agencies, and improved technologies, the available data on the two key ingredients 
in poverty measurement—representative samples of household consumption expenditures (or 
incomes) and data on prices—have improved greatly since global poverty monitoring began. The 
country coverage of credible household survey data suitable for measuring poverty has improved 
markedly, the frequency of data has increased, public access to these data has improved, and the 
                                                 
43  The GDP per capita of SSA in 2005, at 2005 PPP, was $8.13 per day. 
44  The mean consumption of the poor is (1-PG/H)Z where PG is the poverty gap index, H is the 
headcount index and Z is the poverty line.  
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lags in data availability have been reduced appreciably. And with the substantial global effort 
that went into the 2005 International Comparison Program we are also in a better position to 
assure that the poverty lines used in different countries have similar purchasing power, so that 
two people living in different countries but with the same real standard of living are treated the 
same way.  
The results of the 2005 ICP reveal that we have been underestimating the cost of living in 
poor countries in the past; the “Penn effect” is still evident, but it has been over-stated. 
Correcting for this bias has two opposing effects on global poverty measures using an 
international poverty line anchored to the poverty lines in the poorest countries. On the one hand, 
the international poverty line in constant-price $US has to be revised downwards given that the 
upward revisions to the purchasing power parities of poor countries implies lower $US values of 
their national poverty lines. At the same time, the purchasing power of household incomes in 
poor countries is also revised downwards. On balance, we find that the global poverty count 
rises, given that the data indicate larger proportionate revisions to the PPPs for poorer countries. 
Our correction for the bias in past PPPs has added 400 million people to the global count 
for 2005, when judged against an international poverty line that is representative of the national 
poverty lines found in the poorest countries. In China alone, which had not previously 
participated officially in the ICP, the new PPP implies that an extra 10% of the population is 
living below our international poverty line. But the impact is not confined to China; there are 
upward revisions to our past estimates for all regions, consistent with the higher cost of living in 
developing countries implied by the results of the 2005 ICP.   
While the new data suggest that the developing world is poorer than we thought, it has 
been no less successful in reducing the incidence of absolute poverty since the early 1980s. 
Indeed, the overall rate of progress against poverty is fairly similar to past estimates. This is 
hardly surprising, given that changing the PPP base per se does not alter the real growth rates 
over time or the distribution of consumption for individual countries. The trend rate of global 
poverty reduction of 1% point per year turns out to be slightly higher than we had estimated 
previously, due mainly to the higher weight on China’s remarkable pace of poverty reduction. 
The developing world as a whole is clearly still on track to attaining the first Millennium 
Development Goal of halving the 1990s “extreme poverty” rate by 2015. China attained the 
MDG early in the millennium, almost 15 years ahead of the target date.  
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However, the developing world outside China will not attain the MDG without a higher 
rate of poverty reduction than we have seen over 1981-2005. The persistently high incidence and 
depth of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly notable. There are encouraging signs of 
progress in this region since the late 1990s, although lags in survey data availability and 
problems of comparability and coverage leave us unsure about how robust this will prove to be.  
The marked “bunching up” in the global distribution of consumption just above our 
international poverty line is also notable. There are a great many people who have reached the 
frugal $1.25 standard, but are still very poor, and clearly vulnerable to downside shocks. One 
such shock is the steep rise in international food and fuel prices since 2005. Despite the progress 
in reducing the lags in survey data availability, it will probably not be until 2010 that we can 
make a reasonably confident assessment of the ex post impacts of the rising food and fuel prices 
on the world’s poor. Until then, ex ante assessments will be required, based on pre-crisis data 
and economic assumptions. Such assessments suggest that at least a few years of the progress 
reported here have been eroded since 2005.   
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Table 1: Average date of the surveys used for each reference year  
 
 Average date of the surveys used for each reference year 
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia-Pacific 
(EAP) 1982.2 1984.5 1987.3 1990.2 1993.0 1996.1 1999.0 2002.0 2004.9 
       Of which China 1981.0 1984.0 1987.0 1990.0 1993.0 1996.0 1999.0 2002.0 2005.0 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (EECA) 1988.3 1988.3 1988.5 1990.5 1993.3 1996.1 1999.0 2001.7 2004.3 
Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) 1983.6 1984.1 1987.4 1990.6 1993.2 1996.1 1999.0 2002.0 2004.6 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 1987.8 1987.8 1988.5 1990.1 1993.2 1995.8 1998.4 2000.8 2003.4 
South Asia (SA) 1981.9 1983.5 1987.5 1990.2 1993.4 1996.0 1999.0 2001.9 2004.5 
       Of which India 1981.0 1983.0 1987.5 1990.0 1993.5 1996.0 1999.0 2002.0 2004.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) 1989.8 1991.3 1992.0 1993.3 1994.9 1997.3 1999.8 2002.1 2003.5 
Total 1984.1 1985.6 1988.1 1990.6 1993.4 1996.2 1999.1 2001.9 2004.4 
 
 
Table 2: Average lag in survey data availability for the latest reference year by region 
 
Region 
2001 (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2004)
2005 
(Present paper) 
East Asia 0.6 0.1 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.3 0.7 
Latin America and Caribbean 0.9 0.4 
Middle East and North Africa 2.2 1.6 
South Asia 1.6 0.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 1.5 
Total 1.6 0.6 
 
 
Table 3: Proportion of the population represented by household surveys 
 
Coverage rate: % of pop. represented by a survey two years either side of each year  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
EAP 75.5 87.5 90.3 95.1 94.9 95.0 94.1 95.4 95.4 
China 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EECA 0.0 8.5 93.2 58.9 86.7 88.3 91.4 93.8 94.0 
LAC 48.2 34.6 80.9 88.4 87.0 94.7 94.7 96.0 95.7 
MENA 0.0 40.3 39.5 80.4 70.0 73.8 66.5 39.3 65.1 
SA 58.3 89.3 96.5 65.5 97.9 81.4 19.5 77.0 96.9 
India 63.6 100.0 100.0 58.3 100.0 77.3 0.0 77.3 100.0 
SSA 30.7 30.5 26.3 38.0 65.5 61.4 59.6 67.6 70.9 
Total 51.3 65.1 81.3 75.4 89.2 85.4 68.1 83.5 90.6 
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Table 4: Headcount indices of poverty (% below each line) 
 
 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
(a) Aggregate for developing world 
Old estimates using 1993 ICP  
$1.08 (1993)  40.6 33.0 28.7 28.7 25.6 22.8 22.3 20.4 17.2 
New estimates using 2005 ICP  
$1.00 41.4 34.4 29.8 29.5 27.0 23.1 22.8 20.3 16.1 
$1.25 51.8 46.6 41.8 41.6 39.1 34.4 33.7 30.6 25.2 
$1.45 58.4 54.4 49.9 49.4 47.2 42.6 41.6 38.1 32.1 
$2.00 69.2 67.4 64.2 63.2 61.5 58.2 57.1 53.3 47.0 
$2.50 74.6 73.7 71.6 70.4 69.2 67.2 65.9 62.4 56.6 
(b) Excluding China 
Old estimates using 1993 ICP  
$1.08 (1993)  32.0 30.1 28.7 27.1 24.7 24.6 23.8 22.6 21.5 
New estimates using 2005 PPP  
$1.00 29.4 27.6 26.9 24.4 23.3 22.9 22.3 20.7 18.6 
$1.25 39.8 38.3 37.5 35.0 34.1 33.8 33.1 31.3 28.2 
$1.45 46.6 45.5 44.5 42.3 41.6 41.4 40.8 38.9 37.0 
$2.00 58.6 58.1 57.2 55.6 55.6 55.9 55.6 54.0 50.3 
$2.50 65.9 66.7 67.3 65.4 66.0 67.9 67.4 66.0 62.9 
Note: The headcount index is the percentage of the relevant population living in households with 
consumption per person below the poverty line.  
 
 
Table 5: Numbers of poor (millions)  
 
 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
(a) Aggregate for developing world 
Old estimates using 1993 ICP  
$1.08 (1993) 1488.5 1281.4 1178.5 1247.5 1172.4 1092.9 1119.8 1067.1 931.3  
New estimates using 2005 ICP (number in millions below each line at 2005 PPP) 
$1.00 1515.0 1334.7 1227.2 1286.7 1237.9 1111.9 1145.6 1066.6 876.0 
$1.25 1896.2 1808.2 1720.0 1813.4 1794.9 1656.2 1696.2 1603.1 1376.7 
$1.45 2137.7 2111.5 2051.7 2153.5 2165.0 2048.1 2095.7 1997.9 1751.7 
$2.00 2535.1 2615.4 2639.7 2755.9 2821.4 2802.1 2872.1 2795.7 2561.5 
$2.50 2731.6 2858.7 2944.6 3071.0 3176.7 3231.4 3316.6 3270.6 3084.7 
(b) Excluding China 
Old estimates using 1993 ICP  
$1.08 (1993)  854.9 856.1 868.1 873.1 838.2 881.5 897.1 890.5 858.2 
New estimates at 2005 ICP (number in millions below each line at 2005 PPP) 
$1.00 784.5 786.2 814.9 787.6 793.4 823.2 843.2 821.9 769.9 
$1.25 1061.1 1088.3 1134.3 1130.2 1162.3 1213.4 1249.5 1240.0 1169.0 
$1.45 1244.0 1293.2 1348.9 1365.3 1418.9 1488.1 1541.7 1543.5 1535.2 
$2.00 1563.0 1652.1 1732.7 1795.1 1895.2 2009.9 2101.9 2140.8 2087.9 
$2.50 1759.5 1895.4 2037.6 2110.2 2250.4 2439.2 2546.4 2615.6 2611.0 
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Table 6: Regional breakdown of the 2005 headcount index and number of poor  
for various poverty lines  
 (a) Headcount index (% living below poverty line)  
 Poverty line in 2005 prices 
Region $1.00 $1.25 $1.45 $2.00 $2.50 
East Asia and Pacific 9.3 16.8 22.8 38.7 50.7 
      Of which China 8.1 15.9 16.6 36.3 49.5 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 2.2 3.7 5.0 8.9 12.9 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 5.6 8.4 10.5 16.6 22.1 
Middle East and North 
Africa 1.6 3.6 6.2 16.9 28.4 
South Asia 23.7 40.3 52.3 73.9 84.4 
      Of which India 24.3 41.6 53.9 75.6 85.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 39.9 51.2 58.9 73.0 80.5 
Total 16.1 25.2 32.1 47.0 56.6 
 (b) Number of poor (millions) 
East Asia and Pacific 175.6 316.2 429.8 728.7 955.2 
      Of which China 106.1 207.7 216.5 473.7 645.6 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 10.2 17.3 23.5 41.9 61.0 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 30.7 46.1 58.0 91.3 121.8 
Middle East and North 
Africa 4.7 11.0 19.0 51.5 86.7 
South Asia 350.5 595.6 772.3 1091.5 1246.2 
      Of which India 266.5 455.8 590.3 827.7 938.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 304.2 390.6 449.0 556.7 613.7 
Total 876.0 1376.7 1751.7 2561.5 3084.7 
Table 7: Regional breakdown of headcount index for international poverty lines of $1.00-$2.50 a day over 1981-2005 
 (a) % living below $1.00 a day  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 66.8 49.9 38.9 39.1 35.4 23.4 23.5 17.8 9.3 
      Of which China 73.5 52.9 38.0 44.0 37.7 23.7 24.1 19.1 8.1 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 2.1 2.5 3.1 2.7 2.2 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 7.7 9.2 8.9 6.6 6.0 7.3 7.4 7.7 5.6 
Middle East and North 
Africa 3.3 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.6 
South Asia 41.9 38.0 36.6 34.0 29.3 29.1 26.9 26.5 23.7 
      Of which India 42.1 37.6 35.7 33.3 31.1 28.6 27.0 26.3 24.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 42.6 45.2 44.1 47.5 46.4 47.6 47.0 43.8 39.9 
Total 41.4 34.4 29.8 29.5 27.0 23.1 22.8 20.3 16.1 
(b) % living below $1.25 a day  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 77.7 65.5 54.2 54.7 50.8 36.0 35.5 27.6 16.8 
      Of which China 84.0 69.4 54.0 60.2 53.7 36.4 35.6 28.4 15.9 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 1.7 1.3 1.1 2.0 4.3 4.6 5.1 4.6 3.7 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 11.5 13.4 12.6 9.8 9.1 10.8 10.8 11.0 8.4 
Middle East and North 
Africa 7.9 6.1 5.7 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.6 3.6 
South Asia 59.4 55.6 54.2 51.7 46.9 47.1 44.1 43.8 40.3 
      Of which India 59.8 55.5 53.6 51.3 49.4 46.6 44.8 43.9 41.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 53.7 56.2 54.8 57.9 57.1 58.7 58.2 55.1 51.2 
Total 51.8 46.6 41.8 41.6 39.1 34.4 33.7 30.6 25.2 
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Table 7 cont., 
(c) % living below $2.00 a day  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 92.6 88.5 81.6 79.8 75.8 64.1 61.8 51.9 38.7 
      Of which China 97.8 92.9 83.7 84.6 78.6 65.1 61.4 51.2 36.3 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 8.3 6.5 5.6 6.9 10.3 11.9 14.3 12.0 8.9 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 22.5 25.3 23.3 19.7 19.3 21.8 21.4 21.7 16.6 
Middle East and North 
Africa 26.7 23.1 22.7 19.7 19.8 20.2 19.0 17.6 16.9 
South Asia 86.5 84.8 83.9 82.7 79.7 79.9 77.2 77.1 73.9 
      Of which India 86.6 84.8 83.8 82.6 81.7 79.8 78.4 77.5 75.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 74.0 75.7 74.2 76.2 76.0 77.9 77.6 75.6 73.0 
Total 69.2 67.4 64.2 63.2 61.5 58.2 57.1 53.3 47.0 
(d) % living below $2.50 a day 
East Asia and Pacific 95.4 93.5 89.7 87.3 83.7 74.9 71.7 62.6 50.7 
      Of which China 99.4 97.4 92.4 91.6 86.5 76.4 71.7 61.6 49.5 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 15.2 12.5 11.2 12.0 15.1 18.3 21.4 17.8 12.9 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 29.2 32.4 29.6 26.0 25.9 28.8 28.0 28.4 22.1 
Middle East and North 
Africa 39.0 34.8 34.6 31.2 31.4 32.5 30.8 29.5 28.4 
South Asia 92.6 91.5 90.8 90.3 88.6 88.5 86.7 86.5 84.4 
      Of which India 92.5 91.5 90.8 90.2 89.9 88.7 87.6 86.9 85.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 81.0 82.3 81.0 82.5 82.5 84.2 83.8 82.5 80.5 
Total 74.6 73.7 71.6 70.4 69.2 67.2 65.9 62.4 56.6 
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Table 8: Regional breakdown of number of poor (millions) for international poverty lines of $1.00-$2.50 a day over 1981-2005 
 (a) Number living below $1.00 a day   
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 921.7 721.8 590.2 623.4 588.7 404.9 420.8 326.8 175.6 
      Of which China 730.4 548.5 412.4 499.1 444.4 288.7 302.4 244.7 106.1 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 3.0 2.4 2.1 4.1 10.1 11.7 14.4 12.6 10.2 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 28.0 35.8 36.9 29.0 27.6 35.6 37.8 40.7 30.7 
Middle East and North 
Africa 5.6 4.6 4.7 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.7 3.9 4.7 
South Asia 387.3 374.3 384.4 381.2 348.8 368.0 359.5 372.5 350.5 
      Of which India 296.1 282.2 285.3 282.5 280.1 271.3 270.1 276.1 266.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 169.4 195.9 209.0 245.2 259.0 287.6 308.4 310.1 304.2 
Total 1515.0 1334.7 1227.2 1286.7 1237.9 1111.9 1145.6 1066.6 876.0 
(b) Number living below $1.25 a day 
East Asia and Pacific 1071.5 947.3 822.4 873.3 845.3 622.3 635.1 506.8 316.2 
      Of which China 835.1 719.9 585.7 683.2 632.7 442.8 446.7 363.2 207.7 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 7.1 5.7 4.8 9.1 20.1 21.8 24.3 21.7 17.3 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 42.0 52.3 52.3 42.9 41.8 52.2 54.8 58.4 46.1 
Middle East and North 
Africa 13.7 11.6 11.9 9.7 9.8 10.6 11.5 10.3 11.0 
South Asia 548.3 547.6 569.1 579.2 559.4 594.4 588.9 615.9 595.6 
      Of which India 420.5 416.0 428.0 435.5 444.3 441.8 447.2 460.5 455.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 213.7 243.8 259.6 299.1 318.5 355.0 381.6 390.0 390.6 
Total 1896.2 1808.2 1720.0 1813.4 1794.9 1656.2 1696.2 1603.1 1376.7 
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Table 8 cont., 
(c) Number living below $2.00 a day 
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 1277.7 1280.2 1238.5 1273.7 1262.1 1108.1 1104.9 954.1 728.7 
      Of which China 972.1 963.3 907.1 960.8 926.3 792.2 770.2 654.9 473.7 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 35.0 28.4 25.1 31.9 48.6 56.2 67.6 56.8 41.9 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 82.3 98.8 96.3 86.3 88.9 105.7 108.5 114.6 91.3 
Middle East and North 
Africa 46.3 43.9 47.1 44.4 48.0 52.2 51.9 50.9 51.5 
South Asia 799.5 835.9 881.5 926.0 950.0 1008.8 1030.8 1083.7 1091.5 
      Of which India 608.9 635.6 669.0 701.6 735.0 757.1 782.8 813.1 827.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 294.2 328.3 351.3 393.6 423.8 471.1 508.5 535.6 556.7 
Total 2535.1 2615.4 2639.7 2755.9 2821.4 2802.1 2872.1 2795.7 2561.5 
(c) Number living below $2.50 a day 
East Asia and Pacific 1315.8 1352.8 1361.9 1393.7 1393.7 1293.9 1282.8 1150.5 955.2 
      Of which China 987.5 1009.8 1001.7 1040.4 1019.0 930.2 899.2 788.8 645.6 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 64.3 54.4 50.2 55.7 71.0 86.4 101.2 84.0 61.0 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 106.9 126.3 122.6 113.9 119.5 139.5 142.1 150.5 121.8 
Middle East and North 
Africa 67.6 66.1 71.8 70.3 75.9 83.8 84.2 85.2 86.7 
South Asia 855.0 902.1 954.6 1011.0 1056.1 1118.5 1156.8 1216.3 1246.2 
      Of which India 650.3 686.1 725.0 766.5 808.8 841.1 875.2 911.4 938.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 322.0 356.9 383.5 426.4 460.6 509.4 549.5 584.0 613.7 
Total 2731.6 2858.7 2944.6 3071.0 3176.7 3231.4 3316.6 3270.6 3084.7 
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Table 9: Poverty gap index (x100) by region over 1981-2005  
 (a) $1.25  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 35.5 24.2 18.8 18.2 16.4 10.5 10.7 8.0 4.0 
      Of which China 39.3 25.6 18.5 20.7 17.6 10.7 11.1 8.7 4.0 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 4.0 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.3 3.9 4.2 4.2 3.2 
Middle East and North 
Africa 1.6 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 
South Asia 19.6 17.5 16.4 15.2 12.9 12.6 11.7 11.5 10.3 
      Of which India 19.6 17.2 15.8 14.6 13.6 12.4 11.7 11.4 10.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.9 24.6 24.3 26.6 25.6 25.9 25.7 23.5 21.1 
Total 21.3 16.8 14.5 14.2 12.9 11.0 10.9 9.6 7.6 
 (b) $2.00 
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 54.7 44.9 38.0 37.4 34.8 25.9 25.5 20.2 13.0 
      Of which China 59.3 47.3 38.2 40.9 36.6 26.3 25.6 20.6 12.2 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 1.9 1.5 1.3 2.0 3.7 4.1 4.5 3.8 3.0 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 8.9 10.2 9.7 7.8 7.4 8.6 8.6 8.7 6.7 
Middle East and North 
Africa 7.4 6.1 5.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 
South Asia 40.7 38.4 37.2 35.7 32.8 32.7 31.0 30.8 28.7 
      Of which India 40.8 38.2 36.7 35.3 34.1 32.4 31.3 30.8 29.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 38.8 40.6 39.8 42.2 41.4 42.3 42.1 39.7 37.0 
Total 36.5 32.5 29.5 29.1 27.5 24.7 24.3 22.1 18.6 
Note:  The poverty gap index is the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the line where the mean is taken over the whole 
population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gaps.  
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Table 10: Mean consumption of the poor ($ per day) by region over 1981-2005 
 (a) $1.25  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 0.68 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.95 
      Of which China 0.67 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.94 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.89 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.77 
Middle East and North 
Africa 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.98 
South Asia 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 
      Of which India 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.73 
Total 0.74 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 
 (b) $2.00 
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
East Asia and Pacific 0.80 0.97 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.18 1.17 1.20 1.31 
      Of which China 0.79 0.98 1.09 1.03 1.07 1.19 1.17 1.19 1.33 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 1.55 1.56 1.57 1.51 1.38 1.37 1.31 1.29 1.25 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 1.22 1.22 1.20 1.23 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.24 1.26 
Middle East and North 
Africa 1.44 1.47 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.50 1.48 1.50 1.50 
South Asia 1.05 1.10 1.11 1.14 1.19 1.18 1.20 1.20 1.22 
      Of which India 1.06 1.10 1.12 1.15 1.17 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.99 
Total 0.94 1.03 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.21 
 
              Figure 1: National poverty lines plotted against mean consumption  
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       Figure 3: Headcount indices for the developing world 1981-2005 
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                                Figure 4: Numbers of poor by region 1981-2005 
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          Figure 5: Poverty rates for Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Appendix: Coverage of the data set used in this paper 
 
Region Country Survey dates  Welfare 
indicator 
 
Coverage 
rate: % of 
2005 pop. 
represented 
 
East Asia 96.1 Cambodia 1994, 1997, 2004 Expenditure 
  China  1981, 1984, 1987,  Income 
   1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Expenditure 
  Indonesia 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1995, 
1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005 
Expenditure 
  Laos PDR 1993, 1997, 2002 Expenditure 
  Malaysia 1984, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1995, 
1997, 2004 
Income 
  Mongolia 1996, 1998, 2002, 2005  Expenditure 
  Papua New Guinea 1996 Expenditure 
  Philippines  1985, 1988, 1994, 1997, 2000, 
2003, 2006 
Expenditure 
   1991 Income 
  Thailand  1981  Income 
  1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2002, 2004 
Expenditure 
  Timor Leste 2001 Expenditure 
  Vietnam 1992, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006 Expenditure 
98.3 Albania 1996, 2002, 2004, 2005 Expenditure 
 Armenia  1988, 1996 Income 
  1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003 Expenditure 
 Azerbaijan 1988 Income 
  1995, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 Expenditure 
Eastern Europe 
& Central Asia 
 Belarus 1988, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999 Income 
   1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2005 
Expenditure 
  Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
2001, 2004 Expenditure 
  Bulgaria 1989, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 
2001, 2003 
Expenditure 
   1993, 1996 Income 
  Croatia 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005 Expenditure 
   1988, 1998 Income 
  Czech Republic 1988, 1993,1996 Income 
  Estonia 1988, 1993, 1995, Income 
   1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Expenditure 
  Georgia 1996, 1997,  Income 
   1996, 1998-2003, 2005 Expenditure 
  Hungary 1987, 1989, 1993 Income 
   1998-2002, 2004 Expenditure 
  Kazakhstan 1988, 1993 Income 
  1993, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003 Expenditure 
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  Kyrgyz Republic 1988, 1993, 1996, 1998 Income 
  1997-2004 Expenditure 
  Latvia 1988, 1993, 1996, 1998,  Income 
   1998, 2002, 2003, 2004 Expenditure 
  Lithuania 1988, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2000 Income 
   1996, 1998, 2000-2004  Expenditure 
  Macedonia 1988 Income 
   1998, 1999, 2002, 2003 Expenditure 
  Moldova 1988, 1992 Income 
   1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 Expenditure 
  Poland 1985, 1987, 1989, 1993 ,1995-1999 Income  
  1992, 1996, 2000-2002, 2005 Expenditure 
  Romania 1989, 1992, 1994 Income 
   1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 Expenditure 
  Russian Federation 1988, 1993-1998  Income  
  1994-1998, 2000-2002, 2005 Expenditure  
  Slovak Republic 1988, 1993, 1996  Income 
  Slovenia 1987, 1993, 1996 Income 
   1998, 2002, 2004 Expenditure 
  Tajikistan 1988, 1998 Income 
   1999, 2003, 2004 Expenditure 
  Turkey 1987, 1994, 2002, 2003, 2005 Expenditure 
   1994 Income 
  Turkmenistan 1988, 1993  Income 
   1998  Expenditure 
  Ukraine 1988, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999 Income  
  1995, 1996, 1999, 2002-2005 Expenditure 
  Uzbekistan 1989, 1993 Income 
   1998, 2000, 2002, 2003 Expenditure 
97.8 Argentina (urban) 1980, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 
1998, 2001-2005 
Income Latin America  
& Caribbean 
 Bolivia 1986, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2002 Income 
   1999, 2003, 2005 Expenditure 
  Brazil 1979, 1981-1990, 1992, 1993, 
1995-2005 
Income 
   1997 Expenditure 
  Chile 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2003 
Income 
  Colombia 1980, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1995, 96, 
1998-2000, 2003 
Income 
  Costa Rica 1981, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, 
1993, 1995-1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
2004 
Income 
  Dominican Republic 1986, 1989, 1992,1996, 1998, 2000, 
2003-2005 
Income 
  Ecuador 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2005 Income 
   1994-95  Expenditure 
  El Salvador 1989, 1990, 1995-98, 2000, 2002, 
2003 
Income 
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  Guatemala 1986, 1989, 1998, 2002-2004, 2005 Income 
   1998, 2000 Expenditure 
  Guyana 1993, 1998 Expenditure 
  Haiti 2001 Expenditure 
  Honduras 1986, 1989-90, 1992, 1994-1999, 
2003-2005 
Income 
  Jamaica 1988-93, 1995-2004  Expenditure 
  Mexico 1984, 1989, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 
Expenditure 
  1994-1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Income 
  Nicaragua 1993, 2001, 2005  Expenditure 
   1998, 2001   Income 
  Panama 1979, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1996, 
1998, 2000-2004 
Income 
   1997 Expenditure 
  Paraguay 1990, 1995, 1997-1999, 2001, 
2003-2005 
Income 
  Peru 1985, 1991, 1994  Expenditure 
  1997, 2000-2003, 2005 Income 
  St. Lucia 1995  Income 
  Surinam 1999  Income 
  Trinidad and Tobago 1988, 1992 Income 
  Uruguay 1981, 1989, 1996-1998, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 
Income 
  Venezuela 1981, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 
1995-98, 2000, 2003, 2005 
Income 
Middle East  & 79.4 Algeria 1988, 1995  Expenditure 
North Africa  Djibouti 1996, 2002  Expenditure 
  Egypt 1990, 1995, 1999, 2005 Expenditure 
  Iran 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2005 Expenditure 
  Jordan 1986, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2006 Expenditure 
  Morocco 1984, 1990, 1998, 2000/2001, 2007 Expenditure 
  Tunisia 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 Expenditure 
  Yemen 1992, 1998, 2005  Expenditure 
South Asia 98.3 Bangladesh 1983, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1995, 
2000, 2005 
Expenditure 
  Bhutan 2003 Expenditure 
  India 1977/78, 1983, 1987/88, 1993/94, 
2004/05 
Expenditure 
  Nepal 1985, 1995, 2003 Expenditure 
  Pakistan 1986/87, 1990/91, 1992/93, 
1996/97, 1998/99, 2001/02, 
2004/05 
Expenditure 
  Sri Lanka 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 Expenditure 
Angola 2000 Expenditure Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
91.5 
Benin 2003 Expenditure 
  Botswana                     1985/86, 1993 Expenditure 
  Burkina Faso 
 
1994, 1998, 2003 Expenditure 
  Burundi 1992, 1998, 2006 Expenditure 
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  Cameroon 1996, 2001, 2004  Expenditure 
  Cape Verde 2001  Expenditure 
  Central African Rep. 1993, 2003 Expenditure 
  Chad 2002/03 Expenditure 
  Comoros 2004 Expenditure 
  Congo (DRC) 2005/06 Expenditure 
  Congo (ROC) 2005 Expenditure 
  Cote d'Ivoire 1985-88, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002 Expenditure 
  Ethiopia 1981, 1995, 2000, 2004/05 Expenditure 
  Gabon 2005 Expenditure 
  Gambia 1992, 1998, 2003 Expenditure 
  Ghana 1987, 1989, 1991/92, 1998/99, 
2005/2006 
Expenditure 
  Guinea 1991, 1994, 2003 Expenditure 
  Guinea Bissau 1991, 1993, 2002 Expenditure 
  Kenya 1992, 1994, 1997, 2005/06 Expenditure 
  Lesotho 1986, 1993, 1995, 2002 Expenditure 
  Liberia 2005, 2007  Expenditure 
  Madagascar 1980, 1993, 1999, 2001, 2005 Expenditure 
  Malawi 1997, 2004  Expenditure 
  Mali 1989, 1994, 2001, 2006 Expenditure 
  Mauritania 1988, 1993, 1995, 2000  Expenditure 
  Mozambique 1996, 2002 Expenditure 
  Namibia 1993 Expenditure 
  Niger 1992, 1995, 2005 Expenditure 
  Nigeria 1985, 1992, 1996, 2003 Expenditure 
  Rwanda 1985, 1997, 2000 Expenditure 
  Senegal 1991, 1993,1994, 2001, 2005 Expenditure 
  Sierra Leone 1989, 2003 Expenditure 
  South Africa 1993, 1995, 2000 Expenditure 
  Sao Tome & Principe 2000 Expenditure 
  Swaziland 1994, 2000 Expenditure 
  Tanzania 1991, 2000 Expenditure 
  Togo 2006 Expenditure 
  Uganda 1989, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2005 Expenditure 
  Zambia 1991, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2004 Expenditure 
  Zimbabwe 1990/91, 1995 Expenditure 
Note: The “coverage rates” reported here deem a country to be covered if there is at least one survey in 
the data set. By contrast the coverage rates in Table 3 refer only to whether ort not there is a survey within 
two years on either side of the survey year. 
 
